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Interagency Group/Countermessures

I-20201/82

Washington, D.C. 20505

27 AUG 4982

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS AND INVITEES, INTERAGENCY GROUP/ -- COUNTERMEASURES ---

SUBJECT: First Meeting of the IG/CM

The first meeting of the IG/CM is scheduled for Friday,
September 10, 1982, at 1000 hours. The meeting will be held
at 1724 F Street, Northwest, in the sixth floor conference
room. For those who may not have received a copy of SIG-I
Directive No. 1, establishing this group, a copy is appended.

The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss the organization and agenda of the IG/CM. It is my intention, and that of the DCI, that this group play an active and useful role in reviewing and developing national policy, where needed, to improve the manner in which the United States counters and protects against the hostile intelligence threat. to accomplish this by instituting a series of initiatives, to be tasked to individual members of the IG/CM. the responsibility of those so designated to have appropriate persons in their department or agency organize and develop ~ an executive branch response to the particular tasking at hand within the time frames suggested. This may entail establishing ad hoc working groups; written inquiries to affected agencies; coordinating with, or tasking, other interagency committees; or any other means appropriate to the circumstances. Once a position has been formulated by the responsible member agency, it will be forwarded to me as Chairman, and I will circulate it to the other members of the IG/CM for review and concurrence, prior to recommending approval by the SIG-I itself. Recognizing such recommendations may overlap or effect matters under consideration by the IG/CI, as well, they will be coordinated with the Chairman of that IG, as appropriate. Actual meetings will be held to the minimum necessary.

A tentative list of such initiatives, keyed to specific recommendations in the NSSD-2 report, is attached. I would like to have some discussion on these, as well as on my intended approach to our work at initial meeting.

I deliberately decided not to include here the prioritized list of resource enhancements called for by SIG-I Directive No. 1, pending our initial meeting. Efforts on the part of my staff to develop such a list for purposes of this meeting have not proved productive. It is apparent a clearer idea of the role the IG/CM can and should play in identifying and facilitating needed resource enhancements throughout the executive branch is needed before undertaking specific Approved For Release 2007/06/25: CIA-RDP84B00049R001102720009-5

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I look forward to our menting and making this a productive effort.

Richard GV Stilwell General, USA (Ret.) Deputy

Attachment 1 a/s

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LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY INITIATIVES

LEGISLATIVE

- 1. (U) Legislative relief from FOIA to exempt technical data, subject to export control, from its purview (page 53).*
 - a. Alternative 1. Administration-approved amendment to FOIA, making this an additional exemption.

 Action recommended: Justice to ascertain status of amendment, determine best method of achieving. In consultation with Defense, State, and Commerce. Report in one month.
 - b. Alternative 2. Introduce bill authorizing
 Secretary of Defense to withhold such information
 from public. Becomes withholding
 statute under FOIA. Action recommended: DOD has
 drafted such a bill. Needs to expedite internal
 processing and get OMB clearance. Needs to work
 with Armed Services Committees in finding the
 appropriate legislative vehicle.
 - 2. (U) The FY83 Authorization bill for the Department of State gives the Secretary of State authority over real estate acquisitions by certain foreign governments (page 49). The bill has passed the Congress and been signed by the President. Recommended actions: State to advise how authority will be implemented and expected impact on development of U.S. countermeasures. Report in one month.
 - 3. (U) New Criminal Statute on "Leaks" (page 59). The recommendation of the Attorney General Working Group on "leaks" that a new criminal statute be drafted and proposed by the Administration making it a crime for government employees to knowingly and willfully disclose classified information without proper authority ought to be pursued. Recommended action: Justice should be tasked with drafting a legislative proposal, and sponsoring it through the OMB clearance process. While no action could be expected in this Congress, it could provide an opportunity to assess reaction to it. Progress report in one month.
 - 4. (S) Analysis of Legal Restrictions on COMSEC Monitoring (page 55). Justice, in coordination with NSA, should do an analysis of legal restrictions on COMSEC monitoring within the United States, recommending whether changes to existing law should be sought, and, if so, what changes should be made, to permit greater se of such monitoring. Report to be made in two months.

Page references are to NSSD-2 Study.

agencies with access to criminal history records for purposes of background investigations should be sought (page 57).

Justice should take lead in developing such legislation and sponsor through the OMB clearance process. Report to be made in two months.

POLICY

CATEGORY I: Work Largely Done.

- 1. (S) National Policy on Civil Overflights, including establishment of a coordinating mechanism at national level (page 48). Recommended action: DoD take lead in drafting national policy to include papers necessary to establish a national level coordinating mechanism for overflights of civil aircraft. Action due in two months.
- 2. (U) National Policy on Dealing with Leaks (page 59).
 This requires following up on Attorney General Working Group report on "leaks" to ascertain status of recommendations and the desirability of having policy adopted through SIG-I rather than the National Security Advisor. The DCI representative should take lead. Action due in one month.
- 3. (S) National Policy on Encryption of Weapons Telemetry (page 55). Defense has adopted such a policy already. The need here is to ascertain whether such policy should be adopted at the national level, and if so, what it should consist of. This will entail coordination with the National Communications Security Committee. Defense should take the lead. Action due in two months.
- 4. (S) National policy on encryption of satellite communications (page 48). Existing policy should be reviewed, and the nature of possible alternatives or improvements explored. Coordination would be required with National Communications Security Committee. NSA should take the lead. Action due in one month.

CATEGORY II: Work has not begun, but a large effort is not required to support development policy. Actions to be completed in three months.

- 1. (C) The development of a national policy on damage assessments (page 46). The DCI should take the lead.
- 2. (S) The development of a national policy on imagery and ELINT countermeasures (page '48). Defense should take the lead.
- 3. (U) The development of a national policy on personnel security investigations. This will entail a review of applicable executive orders, and development of recommended changes. Defense should also the lead.

4. (S) Encouraging U.S Mission to NATO to take greater role in having missions of NATO members employ better counterintelligence and security measures (page 46). Defense to take lead in coordination with State.

CATEGORY III: Work has not begun, and considerable work is required to support the development of policy. Actions to be completed within four months.

- 1. (C) National TSCM policy. Existing policy and practices should be reviewed. Such topics as cross-servicing arrangements between agencies and better allocation of resources ought to be explored. The desirability of a national policy statement on the subject should be explored, and, if necessary, developed. The DCI representative should take the lead.
- 2. (C) National TEMPEST policy. Same thrust as TSCM study. Defense should take lead, coordinating with the National Communications Security Committee.
- 3. (C) National OPSEC policy (page 61). Examine existing requirements in executive branch and determine desirability and nature of a national policy on OPSEC to apply government-wide. Defense should take lead.
- 4. (C) Technology Transfer (page 53). Are there actions in the enforcement area that are not being taken, or might be improved, by greater participation of U.S. law enforcement, CI and security organizations? Coordination with Justice Committee on Export Control Enforcement required. Treasury to take lead in coordination with FBI and Commerce.
- 5. (U) National policy on industrial security (page 60).
 This should review existing programs and policies. Determine need for uniform policies at national level, explore possibilities for greater cross-servicing, additional requirements, especially to preclude the transfer of unclassified but sensitive technology. Defense should take lead.
- 6. (S) Enhancement of U.S. Embassy security (page 58). The construction of the new embassy in Moscow has highlighted the necessity for comprehensive and detailed security planning prior to and during construction. The desirability of having a national policy statement setting forth requirements and/or mechanisms to consider security arrangements for U.S.—diplomatic establishments should be considered. State to take lead.



TAB

PFIAB Visit - Headquarters Building Tour

(1D10 Hqs, Evan Hineman, DDS&T, & C/AVAD/DMAB/OSWRR-1423)	25X1
-	25X1
- TADS will be graphically demonstrated, improvement over previous paper and hand calculation procedures will be described, time savings will be emphasized.	er 3
- SAFE (prototype electronic mail system) may be demonst relative to analysis on SSMX-20.	trated
OPS CENTER (7G15 Hqs, Bob Gates, DDI, and Center)	C/Ops 25X1
 OPERATIONS CENTER procedures, relationship with the Intelligence Community and the current production cyc reviewed. 	le will be
OTHER AVAILABLE TOURS/BRIEFINGS	
HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (Library: Curator, F	25X1
·· Old E Street Sign	
- General Donovan's Flag	
- OSS Map of Italy	
- General Donovan's Bust - Sculptured by Leo Cherne	15,
- CollectionRepository of literature and other items intelligence interest, foreign and domestic. 22,000	of volumes
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER	25X1
- OPTICAL CHARACTER READER optically reads outgoing mes feeds message into system electronically.	sages and
- SWITCHING center sorts and distributes messages elect	ronically.

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- TECHNICAL CONTROL patches circuits, maintains crypto control.
NEW BUILDING MODEL (Located at intersection of F & J Corridors)
- COST: \$187 million funded in FY-1984.
- CONSTRUCTION begins in FY-1984 and will be completed by FY-1987.
- JUSTIFICATION
* consolidates all employees and entities from leased facilities in Washington area
* provides for the first time space engineered for computers
* substantially improves physical and technical security for Agency operations
* meets OMB cost-effectiveness guidelines for owned vs leased facilities
- APPROVALS have been received from Federal, state and local planning authorities.
BRONZE
 Ecce Homo 1952 by American Giorgio Spaventa (1918-1978) from Vincent Melzac Collection. Ecce Homo is highly representaive of the introspective quality of Spaventa's work.
AGENCY EMPLOYEES WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES IN SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY 38 Stars
<u>NATHAN HALE</u> 1755-1776

25X1